Scientism Is Not Science

Eratosthenes of Cyrene (c. 276-194 BCE)

Science is the most powerful approach humanity has developed to understand the natural world. Just a cursory glance at physics, evolutionary and molecular biology, and countless other fields of scientific inquiry demonstrates the towering success of science. However, there is an increasingly popular strand of “science” known as scientism, which is the idea that science is the only way to apprehend the truth about our world. This view, however popular it may be, has had devastating consequences. For one, many people (even well-known scientists) cannot discern the difference between scientific and philosophical questions. In turn, this has led science and philosophy to appear at war with each other. But even worse, science has become deeply impoverished insofar as it is seen as a friend of atheism and an enemy of theism. Science shows us, so they say, that there is no underlying purpose or meaning in the world because science cannot detect it. And if science cannot detect purpose or meaning, then no such things exist because if such things existed, science would know since it answers everything. But does science really answer all things? Is it the only path to what is most true?

One of the first problems here is the claim that science is the sole arbiter of all knowledge. This claim is self-refuting precisely insofar as no scientific method exists to test whether or not this claim is true. Importantly, such a claim is not at all scientific, but metaphysical — in that, it would require you to step outside of science altogether to know whether or not such a claim is true. We already know, though, that science cannot answer all sorts of things (perhaps the most important questions of all in fact) from the nature of knowledge, why there is something rather than absolutely nothing, why the laws of physics and nature exist in the first place, the nature of mind, freedom of the will, whether or not there is a purposive agency behind the fabric of all that exists, questions about virtues and duties, democracy over tyranny, love, goodness, and beauty, and much more. Science is a mere tool that helps us investigate the workings of the natural world, but that is it. Unfortunately, most talk about science, especially among lay atheists who use it erroneously and disingenuously as a tool to bolster their atheism, is not the product of genuine science, but of scientism. Scientism, to define it in a slightly different way, is the idea that everything we see, experience, and seek to understand — every phenomenon — can be explained by empirical science. Let’s now take a deeper dive into three core problems scientism faces.

The first problem is that its proponents confuse scientific explanations with rational explanations. To illustrate, in Can Science Explain Everything? John Lennox wrote, “Suppose you ask why water is boiling. I may say that heat energy from the gas flame is being conducted through the copper base of the kettle and is agitating the molecules of the water to such an extent that the water is boiling, or I may say the water is boiling because I would like a cup of tea. We see at once that both of these explanations are equally rational. They each make perfect sense but they are very different. The first is scientific and the second is personal, involving my intentions, will, and desire. What is also obvious is that the two explanations do not conflict or even compete — they complement each other.” So, we can see here that there are scientific explanations and rational explanations, both of which complement each other in very intimate ways.

The second problem rests in more confusion, but this time it is about scientific hypotheses and metaphysical demonstrations. Think about scientific arguments starting from empirical premises and drawing probabilistic conclusions. Now, think about mathematical arguments starting from purely conceptual premises and drawing necessary conclusions. Finally, metaphysical arguments combine both forms of reasoning. In other words, metaphysical arguments start from empirical starting points and conceptual premises and we draw necessary conclusions. Therefore, both forms of reasoning are crucial for arriving at a comprehensive picture of ultimate reality.

The third problem is the simple fact that scientists take many things for granted. For example, the scientific enterprise is entrenched in metaphysical assumptions, many of which are completely unknown to scientists, especially those who lack philosophical acuity. Some of which they take for granted or presuppose are things like the idea that there is an external world outside of the mind, objective patterns and regularities exist within the world, numbers exist, the laws of logic exist, our cognitive faculties are functioning properly and the language we use aims toward some kind of truth. Science must presuppose all of these things (among other things) before it even lifts off the ground.

You really cannot understand science unless you understand philosophy. This is because science rests, again, on many assumptions that must be carefully and critically examined through reason. If you do science without philosophy keeping you in check, you are going to begin to think that science can, or will, answer all things eventually. This is in large part why science popularizers such as Lawrence Krauss and Neil deGrasse Tyson must be approached with serious caution. After all, they are either palpably confused or completely unaware of the crucial distinction between the ontological question concerning the contingency of the universe, and the cosmological question of how the current physical reality of the universe arises from a different state within a continuous physical system. Even someone like Richard Dawkins has said, “Evolution answers the question of existence.” This demonstrates that he does not understand questions concerning ontological contingency, or even just the basic idea that existence has nothing to do with the physical arrangements within the natural world. These sorts of mistakes give birth to scientism and make science and philosophy appear at war with each other. And the only reason these mistakes happen is because many scientists are, sadly enough, philosophically illiterate.

In short, while science has made astonishing progress in unraveling the secrets of the natural world, there are questions of profound importance that fall outside of its purview. Genuine science, that is to say, real science, observes certain physical arrangements found within the natural world. From this observation, it makes predictions and draws provisional conclusions. It understands its assumptions and limitations, whereas scientism does not. Scientism attempts to explain away why questions and the very mystery of existence by painting a comprehensive picture of cosmology. But as noted, science cannot address the question of existence since existence does not have anything to do with observable physical arrangements. The question of why is one that science can never, in principle, answer. Even if science somehow gained omniscience about the totality of the natural world, it would still not be an inch closer to answering the question of existence, since existence has absolutely nothing to do with the internal arrangements of the natural world or its causes, but with how a cause or an arrangement, or why anything at all, exists in the first place. Science tells us how, while philosophy tells us why. But both work together in very meaningful and necessary ways once you understand the scope and function of the two.

"What then has to be the case for genuine science as such to be possible? This is a question from outside science and is, by definition, a philosophical — even a metaphysical — question. Those who say that science can answer all questions are themselves standing outside science to make that claim. That is why naturalism, when it strays beyond methodology to talk of what can exist, is a metaphysical theory. Denying metaphysics and upholding materialism must itself be a move within metaphysics. It involves standing outside the practice of science and talking of its scope. The assertion that science can explain everything can never come from within science. It is always a statement about science."

—Roger Trigg, Beyond Matter: Why Science Needs Metaphysics